We study life-cycle asset allocation in the presence of liquidity constraints and undiversifiable labor income risk. The model includes three assets (cash, long-term government bonds and stocks) and takes into account for the life-cycle profile of housing expenditures.
1 Introduction empirical regularities. First, the zero median stock holding puzzle (Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) ) persists. The latest Survey of Consumer Finances reports that only 49 percent of US households hold stocks either directly or indirectly (through pension funds, for instance). Yet, the frictionless portfolio choice model predicts that, given the equity premium, all households should participate in the stock market as soon as saving takes place. Second, households in the model invest almost all of their wealth in stocks, and this result is particularly strong for young households. This is in contrast to both casual empirical observation, and to more formal evidence (see Poterba and Samwick (1999) or Ameriks and Zeldes (2001) , for instance).
In this paper we develop a life-cycle asset allocation model that tries to address these puzzles. Our model has three key features. First, the household can invest in three financial assets: cash, stocks and long-term government bonds. Traditionally, life-cycle asset allocation models have ignored long-term bonds and, in this context, future labor income (even though risky) was found to be a closer substitute for cash rather than stocks. This leads to a very strong demand for equities, particularly for young households. However, in a more general setting with multiple risky assets, the optimal portfolio decision will be determined by the degree of substitutability between human capital and all available financial assets.
Second, we include a fixed entry cost for households which want to invest in risky assets for the first time. A large literature has concluded that some level of fixed costs seems to be necessary to improve the empirical performance of asset pricing models. 4 Since the excessive demand for equities predicted by asset allocation models is merely the portfoliodemand manifestation of the equity premium puzzle, introducing a fixed cost in the model seems to be a natural extension. Empirical work by Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) and Paiella (1999) suggests that small entry costs can be consistent with the observed low stock market participation rates, while Degeorge, Jenter, Moel and Tufano (2002), estimate such a fixedcost in the context of a specific even study and also obtain relatively modest values.
5 4 See, among others, Brav, Constantinides, Geczy (2002), Polkovnichenko (2000) , Basak and Cuoco (1998) , Vayanos (1998) , Luttmer (1996 Luttmer ( , 1999 , Heaton and Lucas (1996) , He and Modest (1995) , Saito (1995) , Aiyagari and Gertler (1991) or Constantinides (1986) . 5 Campbell, Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2001) introduce a fixed-cost in a life-cycle asset allocation Third, we take into account life-cycle expenditure patterns implied by housing consumption. In a model with uninsurable labor income, total financial wealth is a crucial variable for determining both the participation decision and the optimal asset allocation. Therefore it is important to have a realistic profile of life-cycle expenditures. Given the existence of distortions between the housing sales market and the housing rental market (e.g. tax incentives), young households have a stronger incentive to buy a house and increase their spending early in life. We use data from the PSID to calibrate a typical life-cycle profile of housing expenditures and include it (exogenously) in the model.
We find that a small fixed cost can rationalize the participation rates observed in the data, for very low values of risk aversion (less than 2). In fact, perhaps surprisingly, participation
rates are an increasing function of risk aversion, at least over a very wide range of values.
More precisely, the benefit of investing in the stock market is proportional to the level of wealth accumulation. As a result, households that do not accumulate much wealth will not find it worthwhile to incur the fixed cost. Since in the model young households only save for precautionary reasons, their wealth accumulation is determined both by the degree of prudence and by the degree of background risk (labor income risk). Given the link between risk aversion and prudence, the more risk-averse (more prudent) households are also the ones that will save more, and therefore the ones that will have the strongest incentive to pay the entry cost and invest in risky assets.
This result has one very important implication: an increase in background risk (e.g. by introducing uncertainty about the parameters of the labor income process, consumption risk, or housing/mortgage risk) will not help to solve the participation puzzle; it will actually make the divergence between theory and reality stronger. When faced with higher background risk, the agent will build up a larger buffer stock of wealth early in life, thus creating a stronger model, and find that it has a very small impact on the participation decision. On the other hand Haliassos and Michaelides (2002) argue that, in an infinite horizons model with impatient households (as defined in Deaton (1991) ), a small one-time entry cost can generate much larger stock market non-participation as the consumer only accumulates a small buffer of assets, and therefore the benefit from investing in equities is much lower. Attanasio, Banks and Tanner (2002) argue that the implications of the Consumption Capital Asset
Pricing Model cannot be rejected for households predicted to hold both stocks and bonds ("shareholders").
incentive to enter the stock market. That is indeed what we obtain in our model, when labor income risk is increased.
To generate significant non-participation it is important to be able to separate risk aversion from the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. In order to smooth consumption over time, young households would like to borrow against their future labor income, instead of saving for precautionary reasons. A low EIS decreases the savings of the young, as it makes them less willing to engage in intertemporal consumption smoothing. However, with CRRA preferences, as we decrease prudence (risk-aversion) we are also simultaneously increasing the EIS, and as a result savings are not significantly reduced. On the other hand,
with Epstein-Zin preferences we can decrease prudence and the EIS simultaneously and the model generates very low participation for a wider range of risk aversion values.
Under almost all specifications, immediately after paying the fixed cost, households invest almost all of their wealth in stocks. The desire to pay the cost is motivated by the willingness to hold stocks, not long-term bonds. The exception occurs when we allow for correlation between stock returns and labor income shocks. In this case households which have just recently paid the fixed cost, invest a significant fraction of their wealth in all three assets. In fact, in the three-asset model, even a moderate degree of correlation between stock returns and earnings shocks generates a very large negative hedging demand, with a significant crowding-out effect on stock holdings. With a correlation coefficient of 0.25, during workinglife the typical household almost never invests more than 45% of her wealth in the stock market. However, this result is obtained with a relatively high coefficients of risk aversion (5), which in turn implies extremely high participation rates. Therefore, our results suggest that matching both facts simultaneously requires some preference heterogeneity.
Our results rationalize the asset allocation puzzle identified by Canner, Mankiw and Weil (1997): popular financial advisors recommend that more risk-averse investors should allocate a higher fraction of their risky portfolio (stocks plus bonds) to bonds. This is inconsistent with the predictions of the static and frictionless Capital Asset Pricing Model which implies that all investors should hold the same combination of risky assets; risk aversion only determines the size of the investment to the risky assets as a whole. Brennan and Xia In this paper we show that the combination of borrowing constraints and undiversifiable human capital also rationalizes this puzzle. The more risk averse households accumulate more wealth over the life-cycle, and therefore they invest a larger fraction of their wealth in (safer) labor income substitutes such as long-term bonds. Moreover, the more risk averse investors also "care more" about background risk (labor income risk), thus increasing the crowding out effect for stocks, and again leading them to allocate a larger fraction of their portfolio to long-term bonds.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes results from the existing empirical literature on life-cycle asset allocation. Section 3 outlines the model and solution method, while the corresponding results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 provides some extensions of the baseline model, which significantly improve its empirical predictions, while section 6 concludes.
Empirical Evidence on Life-Cycle Asset Allocation and Stock Market Participation
In most industrialized countries, stock market participation rates have increased substantially during the last decade. 6 Nevertheless, the majority of the population still does not own any stocks (either directly or indirectly through pension funds), and the participation decision occurs gradually over the life cycle. Figure 1 .4 plots the participation rates for the different countries.
It shows an increasing participation rate until age 60: for all countries the participation rate is higher for the age bracket 50-60 than for the age bracket 20-30. After age 60, 4 out of 5
countries have a decreasing participation rate, which could be due to cohort effects.
Although several other papers have contributed to this research, our objective here is to briefly report the main results, rather than provide a detailed literature survey. 8 We can summarize the existing evidence as follows. First, at least 50% of the population does not own equities. Second, participation rates increase significantly during working life and there is some evidence suggesting that they might decrease during retirement although this might be due to cohort effects. Third, conditional on stock market participation, households invest a large fraction of their financial wealth in alternative assets but there is no clear pattern of equity holdings over the life-cycle. 7 Note that, even ignoring time and cohort effects, Figures 1a and 1c are not directly comparable because Figure 1c also conditions on stock market participation, hence the higher level of stockholdings. 8 Other important papers on this topic include Heaton and Lucas (2000) and Guiso, Jappelli and Terlizzese (1996) (which focus mostly on the impact of background risk on asset allocation), Bertaut and Haliassos (1997) and King and Leape (1998) .
3 The Model
Preferences
Time is discrete and t denotes adult age which following the typical convention in this literature, corresponds to effective age minus 19. Each period corresponds to one year and agents live for a maximum of T = 81 periods (age 100). The probability that a consumer/investor is alive at time (t + 1) conditional on being alive at time t is denoted by p t (p 0 = 1). Households have Epstein-Zin utility functions (Epstein and Zin (1989) ) defined over one single non-durable consumption good:
where ρ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, ψ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, β is the discount factor and C t is the consumption level at time t. Although the numerical solution can easily accommodate a bequest motive, we set it to zero in this model. Therefore, the terminal condition for the recursive equation (1) is:
Labor Income Process
The labor income process before retirement is the same as the one used by Gourinchas and Parker (2001), or Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (1999) , and it is given by
where f (t, Z it ) is a deterministic function of age and household characteristics Z it , P it is a "permanent" component, and U it a transitory component. We assume that the ln U it , and ln N it are each independent and identically distributed with mean {−.5 * σ n , respectively. The log of P it , evolves as a random walk with a deterministic drift, f (t, Z it ).
Given these assumptions, the growth in individual labor income follows
and its unconditional variance equals (σ 2 n + 2σ 2 u ). This process has a single Wold representation that is equivalent to the MA(1) process for individual earnings growth estimated using household level data (MaCurdy (1982), Abowd and Card (1989) , and Pischke (1995)). 10 For simplicity retirement is assumed to be exogenous and deterministic, with all households retiring at age 65 (time period K = 46). Earnings in retirement (t > K) follow:
Y it = λP iK , where λ is the replacement ratio (a scalar between zero and one). This specification considerably facilitates the solution of the model, as it does not require the introduction of an additional state variable.
Adjusting for life-cycle patterns in expenditures
Durable goods, and in particular housing, can provide an incentive for higher spending early in life (for example if there are frictions in the corresponding rental markets). Modelling these decisions directly is beyond the scope of the paper, but nevertheless we will take into account these potential patterns in life-cycle expenditures. Using the P.S.I.D., for each age (t) we estimate the percentage of household income that is dedicated to housing expenditures (he t ) and subtract it from the measure of disposable income. 11 More details on this estimation are given below, when we discuss the calibration of the model.
Financial Assets
The investment opportunity set is constant and there are three financial assets, one riskless asset (treasury bills or cash) and two risky assets, stocks and long-term (government) bonds.
The riskless asset yields a constant gross after tax real return, R f , while the risky assets returns (denoted by R S t and R B t ) are given by
10 Although these studies generally suggest that individual income changes follow a MA(2), the MA(1) is found to be a close approximation. 11 A similar approach is taken by Flavin and Yamashita (2002) in a model without labor income.
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We allow for positive correlation between stock returns and earnings shocks, as a number of recent theoretical papers argue for the importance of positive correlation between stock returns and (permanent) earnings shocks for portfolio choice decisions. 14 More formally, we let the permanent earnings innovation follow:
where ln N * it follows a standard normal, and φ is the correlation coefficient between ln N it and εt σε .
Before investing in risky assets for the first time, the investor must pay a fixed lump cost. This entry fee represents both the explicit transaction cost from opening a brokerage account and, more importantly, the (opportunity) cost of acquiring information about the stock market. 15 The fixed cost (F ) is scaled by the level of permanent component of labor income (P it ) as this will (significantly) simplify the solution of the model, but also motivated by the opportunity cost interpretation for the entry fee. 12 With this specification we abstract from term structure considerations (or correlation between stock returns and bond returns) since we are not interested in market timing issues (see, among others, Campbell, Lagnado (1997)). 13 In a fully specified term structure model we can not have a riskless short-term bond and a risky long-term bond. We consider R f as a constant, to keep the results more directly comparable with the ones previously obtained in this literature. In any case, the historical mean annualized standard deviation of 6-month US T-bills is 3%, and in our calibration we use data on excess returns (relative to the T-bill). 14 . 15 One could argue that the fixed cost is smaller for government bonds than for stocks, and naturally this would decrease stock market participation early in life. However, since the cost is already hard to calibrate as it is, we decided not to pursue this possibility further at this stage.
Wealth accumulation
Following Deaton (1991) we denote cash on hand as the liquid resources available for consumption and saving. We define a dummy variable I P which is equal to one when the cost is incurred for the first time and zero otherwise. When the stock market entry fee has not
been paid yet, next period's cash on hand (X i,t+1 ) is given by
where S it , LB it and B it denote respectively stock holdings, holdings of long-term bonds and riskless asset holdings (cash) at time t, and he t is the fraction of income dedicated to housing-related expenditures. If the fixed cost was already paid in the past, we have
Moreover, the household must allocate her cash-on-hand (X it ) between consumption expenditures (C it ) and savings, so that
Finally, as in Deaton (1991), we prevent households from borrowing against their future labor income. More specifically we impose the following restrictions:
The optimization problem and solution method
The complete optimization problem can now be written as
where V 0 is given by equations (1) and (2); subject to the constraints given by equations (6) to (14), and to the stochastic labor income process given by (3) and (4) if t 6 K, and
Analytical solutions to this problem do not exist. We therefore use a numerical solution method based on the maximization of the value function to derive optimal decision rules.
The details are given in appendix A, and here we just present the main idea.
We first simplify the solution by exploiting the scale-independence of the maximization problem and rewriting all variables as ratios to the permanent component of labor income
The laws of motion and the value function can then be rewritten in terms of the normalized variables, and we use lower case letters to denote them (for instance,
).
This allows us to reduce the number of state variables to three: age (t), normalized cash-onhand (x it ) and participation status (whether the fixed cost has already been paid or not).
In the last period the policy functions are trivial (the agent consumes all available wealth) and the value function corresponds to the indirect utility function. We can use this value function to compute the policy rules for the previous period, and given these obtain the corresponding value function. This procedure is then iterated backwards. We optimize over the different choices using grid search.
Computing Transition Distributions
It is common practice for researchers to simulate a model over the life-cycle for a large number of individuals (say 10000) and then compute the statistics of interest (mean wealth holdings, for instance) for any given age. We propose an alternative method of computing various statistics that is based on the explicit calculation of the transition distribution of cash on hand from one age to the next. There are a number of important advantages in using the transition distributions rather than simulation in this analysis. First, there is no need to use an interpolation procedure at any stage (see appendix B), thereby avoiding potential numerical approximation errors that might arise from interpolation. Second, the distributions provide an explicit metric of inequality for different variables over time and therefore can potentially be more suitable in matching the model to the data. The computational details are delegated to Appendix B. Once we have the transition densities we can easily obtain all the relevant population means at each age. The unconditional mean consumption for age t can then be computed as
where J is the number of grid points used in the discretization of normalized cash on hand, and π I t,j and π O t,j are the probability masses associated with each grid point, respectively for stockholders and non-stockholders. The participation rate at age t (θ t ) is given by
where x * is the trigger point that causes participation, which is determined endogenously through the participation decision rule.
If we denote the share of liquid wealth invested in the stock market, long-term bonds and cash at age t by α 
3.8 Parameter Calibration
Preference Parameters
We will start by presenting results for a relatively standard choice, (risk aversion) ρ = 5, (EIS) ψ = 0.2 and (discount factor) β = 0.95. However, later on we will report results for several different values of both the coefficient of relative risk aversion (ρ) and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (ψ), as these will have very important implications for our results.
We use the mortality tables of the National Center for Health Statistics to parameterize the conditional survival probabilities. 16 Superscript I denotes a variable for households participating in the stock market while superscript O denotes households out of the stock market.
Labor Income Process
Carroll ( 
Asset Returns
The constant net real interest rate (R f − 1) is set at 2 percent, and the bond return process is calibrated using the historical mean and standard deviation of twenty-year US government bonds, so µ B = 2%, and σ ε B = 8%. 17 For the stock return process we consider a mean equity With respect to the fixed cost of participation, for most of the paper we will consider two cases: one where the cost is zero, and one where it equals 0.05 (5% of the household's expected annual income, gross of housing expenditures). However, we will also report results 17 These values are not particularly sensitive to the choice of the maturity date.
for the intermediate case of F = 0.025. However it has been argued that these estimations using micro-data suffer from a small sample bias as the time-series dimension is too short, and in fact estimations using macro data and longer time horizons usually yield more significant correlations (see, for example Jermann (1999) ). Therefore we start by considering a case with zero correlation (φ = 0) and later on we will relax this assumption.
Housing expenditures
We measure housing expenditures using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics from 1976 until 1993. 18 For each household, in each year, we compute the ratio of annual mortgage payments and rent payments (housing related expenditures -HE) relative to annual labor income (Y ):
We combine mortgage payments and rent together since we are not modelling the housing decision explicitly. We do not care whether the household owns or rents the house where she lives, we just assume that she derives the same utility from it, in both cases. We identify the age effects by running the following regression on the full panel:
where age is defined as the age of the head of the household. We eliminate all observations with age greater than 75. 19 The estimation results are reported in Table 1 . 18 Before 1976 there is no information on mortgage expenditures, and 1993 is the last year available on final release from the PSID. 19 There are several reasons for eliminating these households. First , there are very few observations within each age group beyond age 75. Second, for most of these households the values of he it are equal to zero.
Third, this is consistent with the estimation procedure used for the labor income process (see Cocco et al. (99) ).
In the model we use
which, given our parameter estimates, truncates he t at zero for age > 80. Early in life the household is liquidity constrained and saves only a small buffer stock of wealth. From age 30 onwards she starts saving for retirement and quickly accumulates significant wealth that allows her to smooth consumption after age 65. During the retirement period, consumption decreases at a very fast pace, as a result of the very high effective discount rate (high mortality risk). 20 20 Net income increases during the first years of retirement because the housing expenditures (he t ) are positive and decreasing towards zero. Figure 2 .4 graphs the unconditional mean asset allocation in equities (α S t ), long-term bonds (α LB t ) and cash (α B t ). In the two asset case, even though earnings risk is uninsurable, cash is a closer substitute for future labor income than stocks (e.g. Heaton and Lucas (1996), Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (1999) or Viceira (2001)). We show that, by adding long-term bonds to the model this result remains unchanged, and moreover the long-term bond itself also acts as a close substitute for labor income. Young households, which are "overinvested in their human capital", allocate most of their financial wealth to stocks and only invest in labor income substitutes (long-term bonds or cash) as they get older. 21 When retirement savings is at its peak, more than 50% of total wealth is now being invested in long-term bonds and only approximately 40% is being invested in the stock market.
Asset Allocation
During retirement both future labor income (transfers) and wealth are falling, and the asset allocation is determined by the relative speed at which these two decrease. In our case wealth decreases at a faster rate and therefore the share of wealth invested in stocks is increasing with age. 22 As shown in Cocco et al. (1999) this result is quite sensitive to the assumptions about the existence and strength of a bequest motive, which in turn have a very small impact on the pre-retirement asset allocation. Therefore, from now on we will only report the asset allocation during the working life period. Figure 3 .1 plots the evolution of the distributions of cash on hand for the two types of agents:
Results with Fixed Participation Cost 4.2.1 Consumption, Wealth and Participation Decision
participants and non-participants in the stock market at age 30. These are conditional distributions, and the participation rate can be used as a probability weight to generate the unconditional distribution of cash on hand in the cohort. There is a pronounced spike at around the normalized cash on hand level of 0.8; beyond that level, stock market participation 21 During the very first years of adult life households hold a small fraction of their wealth in cash since the present value of future labor income is actually still increasing (as shown by Cocco et al. (1999) ). 22 Except during the very last years, when most households have no wealth left anymore.
becomes optimal and the two distributions overlap for a small interval mostly representing the incurrence of the fixed entry cost. The distribution is now made up almost completely of rich stockholders and poor non-stockholders. Figure 3 .2 plots the distributions of cash on hand for ages 50 for both types of agents. Conditional on age, the distribution of cash on hand for stock holders has a higher variance than the wealth distribution for the households which have not participated in the stock market. 
Asset Allocation
The main conclusions from Figure 3 .5, which plots the asset allocation decision, are the following. First, the desire to pay the entry cost is motivated by the willingness to hold stocks, not long-term bonds. Immediately after paying the fixed cost, households invest almost all of their wealth in stocks. One implication of this result is that, in our benchmark specification, the stock market participation rate will be almost identical as in the corresponding 2-asset model without long-term bonds.
Extensions

Allowing for Correlation Between Labor Income Shocks and Stock Returns
So far we have not allowed for correlation between labor income shocks and stock returns (φ = 0). As argued before, although it seems clear that we can reject very large values of φ, the empirical evidence is relatively inconclusive (see the discussion on the calibration section). Here we relax this assumption and consider a correlation coefficient (φ) equal to 0.25. 
Changing risk aversion and the impact of background risk
Next we turn our attention to the participation rate. We start by decreasing the coefficient of relative risk aversion (ρ) to 2 while maintaining the CRRA assumption, thus increasing the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (ψ) to 0.5. A lower ρ generates less risk aversion which leads to an increase in the optimal share of wealth invested in equities. However, it also generates less prudence which reduces buffer stock wealth accumulation, and this decreases the incentive to pay the fixed cost. The balance between these effects will determine the optimal time at which the fixed entry cost is paid. 24 For lower values of risk aversion this positive correlation has a very small impact on the asset allocation decisions (the results are again available upon request). lower. We will discuss these results again in the next section.
Separating risk aversion from the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
In our model young households are liquidity constrained and they only save for precautionary reasons. In the absence of labor income risk they would even like to borrow so as to smooth 25 The mean allocation to cash is just the residual of the two and therefore we will omit it from now on.
their life-time consumption. Therefore, their savings behavior is determined by this trade-off between the desire to smooth consumption (EIS) and the desire to insure themselves against labor income risk (prudence). Within the CRRA framework, when we decrease savings by decreasing prudence (ρ), we are also increasing it by increasing the EIS (ψ). 26 If we depart from the CRRA specification, we can simultaneously decrease risk aversion (ρ) and the EIS (ψ), thus significantly reducing the wealth accumulation of the young. This is shown in figure 4 .5, where we plot the previous results, CRRA with ρ = 5 and ρ = 2, and some new ones. First we consider the case with ρ = 2 and reduce ψ from 0.5 to 0.1. With the higher EIS the participation rate was close to 60% by age 25, while now it is still only 25%. Moreover, it reached 100% by age 35, and now it takes almost an extra 10 years to get to that level. However, we can do much better than this. Keeping ψ = 0.1, we next decrease risk aversion even further. With ρ = 1.5 the participation rate is almost zero until age 30 and it peaks at around 60% just before retirement. Given the current demographic distribution this implies an overall participation rate far below 50%.
It is important to note that we do not need to assume extremely low values of ψ to generate large non-participation, as we can compensate for higher EIS by reducing risk aversion even more. For example, if we reduce risk aversion to 1.2, while still keeping ψ = 0.1 (the last series in the figure 4.5), then there is no stock market participation at all.
Therefore, if we keep risk aversion constant at this new level (ρ = 1.2), we can now increase the EIS to obtain more realistic predictions. In table 2a we report the average stock market participation rate (P ) for different combinations of preference parameters computed as
where D age is the demographic weight of each age. With ρ = 1.2 we obtain very low participation rates over a very wide range of ψ. Only if we increase risk aversion to 1.5 must we impose a tight constraint on the EIS. For ψ close to 0.5 the participation rate starts to exceed 50%. If we increase risk aversion even further then the model predicts extremely high participation rates even for extremely low values of the EIS.
Why does a low value of EIS generate stock market non-participation for low values of prudence? These households can maintain smooth consumption profiles (relative to their earnings) without holding a large amount of financial wealth (as in the Deaton (1991) infinite horizon model). The finding here is that this can behavior can take place throughout the working life cycle; these households then rely on their pension payment to finance consumption during retirement. Potentially, the behavior of a large part of the U.S. population that retires without much financial assets (and tends not to participate in the stock market) could be described adequately by the model.
In table 2b we report the participation rates implied by a lower value of the entry cost, namely F = 0.025. In this case, we need much lower values of risk aversion and/or EIS to match the data. All the combinations previously considered deliver a participation rate in excess of 50% except for ρ = 1.2 and ψ = 0.1.
An explanation for the Canner, Mankiw and Weil puzzle
The results in this paper also rationalize the asset allocation puzzle identified by Canner, 
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In a model with undiversifiable human capital the optimal asset allocation is determined by two factors. The first one is the ratio of financial wealth relative to future labor income.
When this ratio is low, households invest less of their financial wealth in assets that are 27 In figure 4 .4, during the first few years the average stock holdings of the less risk-averse households are actually lower. This is just driven by the previously shown differences in the participation rates.
close substitutes for labor income, such as cash or long-term bonds. Since more risk averse households accumulate more wealth over the life-cycle (see figure 4. 2), they also invest a larger fraction of their wealth in (safer) labor income substitutes such as long-term bonds, and consequently the fraction allocated to stocks is smaller.
In addition, there is also the background risk effect. In the context of our model this crowding out effect is stronger for stocks and negative (crowding in) for cash. Long-term bonds, given their intermediate risk profile, must necessarily fall in the middle. Therefore, for a given financial wealth accumulation, an investor that "cares more" about labor income risk, will hold relatively less stocks and relatively more bonds. Since the more risk averse investors are the ones that "care more" about background risk, they will allocate a larger fraction of their portfolio to long-term bonds.
Conclusion
This paper studies optimal consumption and portfolio choice over the life-cycle in the presence of undiversifiable idiosyncratic labor income risk, borrowing and short sale constraints, and fixed entry costs associated with the investment in risky assets.
We find that a small fixed cost can rationalize the participation rates observed in the data, for very low values of risk aversion (less than 2). A lower coefficient of relative risk aversion actually leads to a decrease in the participation rate. This result occurs because of the link between prudence and risk aversion, which implies that a less risk-averse investor accumulates less wealth early in life, and this decreases the incentive to pay the fixed cost.
This implies that an increase in background risk (e.g. by introducing uncertainty about the parameters of the labor income process, consumption risk, or housing/mortgage risk) should actually make the participation puzzle worse, as the agent will accumulate a larger buffer stock of wealth thus creating a stronger incentive to enter the stock market. With CRRA preferences it is hard to generate significant non-participation, given the link between risk aversion (prudence) and the EIS. On the other hand, with Epstein-Zin preferences, we can decrease both parameters simultaneously and obtain very low participation rates for a wider range of values of risk aversion.
Long-term bonds are a stronger substitute for human capital and this result rationalizes the asset allocation puzzle identified by Canner, Mankiw and Weil (1997) . More risk-averse households are more keen to compensate for the decrease in human capital (over the lifecycle) with a larger investment in relatively safer long-term bonds, while less risk-averse households invest their financial wealth almost fully in stocks.
Finally, the model is also able to match asset allocation decisions. If households are sufficiently risk averse, then a moderate degree of correlation between stock returns and earnings shocks generates a very large negative hedging demand, with a significant crowdingout effect on stock holdings. However, the degree of risk aversion required to generate this result implies a counterfactually high stock market participation rate. Therefore, our results suggest that matching both facts simultaneously requires some level of preference heterogeneity.
Appendix A: Numerical Solution Method
We first simplify the solution by exploiting the scale-independence of the maximization problem and rewriting all variables as ratios to the permanent component of labor income (P it ). The laws of motion and the value function can then be rewritten in terms of these normalized variables, and we use lower case letters to denote them (for instance,
This allows us to reduce the number of state variables to three; one continuous state variable (cash on hand, x it ) and two discrete state variables (age, t, and participation status, whether the fixed cost has been paid or not). We discretize the state-space along the cash-on-hand dimension (the only continuous state variable), so that the relevant policy functions can now be represented on a numerical grid.
We solve the model using backward induction. In the last period (t = T ) the policy functions are trivial, as the agent consumes all available wealth, c T = x T . As a result the value function corresponds to the indirect utility function, V T (x T , .) = V (x T ), regardless of whether the fixed cost has been paid before or not. For every age t prior to T , and for each point in the state space, we optimize using grid search. So we need to compute the value associated with each level of consumption, the decision to pay the fixed cost, and the share of liquid wealth invested in both stocks and long-term bonds. From the Bellman equation these values are given as current utility plus the discounted expected continuation value (E t V t+1 (., .)), which we can compute since we have just obtained V t+1 . We perform all numerical integrations using Gaussian quadrature to approximate the distributions of the innovations to the labor income process and the risky asset returns. We evaluate the value function, for points which do not lie on state space grid, using a cubic spline interpolation.
Once we have computed the value of all the alternatives we just pick the maximum, thus obtaining the policy rules for the current period (S t , LB t and B t ). At each point of the state space, the participation decision is computed by comparing the value function conditional on having paid the fixed cost (adjusting for the payment of the cost itself) with the value function conditional on non-payment. Substituting these decision rules in the Bellman equation we obtain this period's value function (V t (., .)), which is then used to solve the previous period's maximization problem. This process is iterated until t = 1.
Appendix B: Computing the Transition Distributions
To find the distribution of cash on hand, we first compute the relevant optimal policy rules; bond and stock policy functions for stock market participants and non-participants and the {0, 1} participation rule as a function of cash on hand. Let b I (x), Lb I (x) and s I (x) denote respectively the cash, (long-term) bonds and stock policy rules for individuals participating in the stock market, and let b O (x) be the savings decision for the individual out of the stock market. We assume that households start their working life with zero liquid assets. During working life, for the households that have not paid the fixed cost, the evolution of normalized cash on hand is given by 28
where w(x) is defined by the last equality and is conditional on { Pt P t+1
} and the deterministically evolving
. Denote the transition matrix of moving from x j to x k , 29 conditional on not having paid the fixed cost as T O kj . Let ∆ denote the distance between the equally spaced discrete points of cash on hand. The random permanent shock
is discretized using Gaussian quadrature with H points:
Numerically, this probability is calculated using
Making use the approximation that for small values of σ
, and denoting the mean of (1 − he t )U by U and its standard 28 To avoid cumbersome notation, the subscript i that denotes a particular individual is omitted in what follows. 29 The normalized grid is discretized between (x min, x max) where x min denotes the minimum point on the equally spaced grid and x max the maximum point. 30 The dependence on the determinastically evolving exp(f (t,Zt)) exp(f (t+1,Z t+1 )) is implied and is omitted from what follows for expositional clarity.
deviation by σ, the transition probability conditional on N m equals
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function for the standard normal. The unconditional probability from x j to x k is then given by
Given the transition matrix T O (letting the number of cash on hand grid points equal to J, this is a J by J matrix; T O kj represents the {kth,jth} element), the next period probabilities of each of the cash on hand states can be found using
We next use the vector Π 
The same methodology (but with more algebra and computations) can then be used to derive the transition distribution for cash on hand conditional on having paid the fixed cost, T I t . The corresponding normalized cash on hand evolution equation is
where w(x) is now conditional on {R
are discretized using Gaussian quadrature with H points:
where Pr(R = N n´, and where the independence between
, R S t+1 and R B t+1 was used. 32 Numerically, this probability is calculated using
The transition probability conditional on N n , R S l and R B m equals
The unconditional probability from x j to x k is then given by
Given the matrix T I , the probabilities of each of the states are updated by 31 The dependence on the non-random earnings component is omitted to simplify notation. 32 The methodology can be applied for an arbitrary correlation structure between the stock market and permanent shock innovation. Table 2b : Average stock market participation rate (P ) as function of risk aversion (ρ) and elasticity of intertemporal substitution (ψ). The fixed cost entry cost (F ) is set at 0.025. 
